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Reforming Alabama's Constitution
Angela K. Lewis•
George Munchus
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Since the p assage of th e Ala b ama Co n s tituti o n of 19 01 ,
many citizens and p oli ti ca l l ea d e rs in A labama ha ve at tempted unsuccessf ull y to rewr it e it . A !th o ug h A la b a ma
has made prog ress in ref o rm ing th e co nstit u t ion w ith th e
work of a co n stit ut io nal co mmi ssio n in 19 7 3, mu c h wo rk
rema ins.

T

he focus of this article is constitutional reform in Alabama. We divide the article into two sections. The first
section reviews methods of constitutional change in the
American states and explores reasons for success or failure. The
next section discusses the history of constitutional change in Alabama and it includes summaries of the public's opinions about
constitutional change in that Alabama.
METH ODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Constitutional revision in the American states has occurred
with varying frequency, often with significant partisan political
influence (Goodman et al., 1973). In a typical scenario, change
initiatives originate among the educated, the upper-middle class
who advocate "good government" as a basis of political support.
Upwardly mobile lower income groups and institutional representatives, such as state legislators and agency heads, are more
likely to oppose constitutional change as a threat to the status
quo and their positions of power in state politics. Major revisions
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of constitutions or the complete rewriting of the document
through a state constitutional convention is not common practices in the states. In the 19th century, there were numerous revisions of state constitutions, as well as adoptions of constitutions
by new states. The 1800s saw the adoption of ninety-four state
constitutions. The 20 th century only saw twenty-three new constitutions. The 21 st century, though relatively young, has not seen
a single, new constitution (Tarr 2002).
th
Shortly before the beginning of the 20 century, many
Southern states revised their constitutions because of a backlash
of the populist movement (Rogers and Ward 1994). Southern
elites, seeking a way to disenfranchise Blacks and poor whites
used a constitutional framework to do so. Most of these constitutions did not conform to the United States Constitution and were
challenged extensively, especially beginning in the 1960s. For
example, Georgia had ultimately to adopt a new constitution
in1975 after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Georgia "county unit" electoral system. The Supreme Court ruled that the
county unit system violated the "one person, one vote" rule (Hill
1994).
One way to change a state constitution is to add an amendment. Likewise, some states may call a constitutional convention
to change their state's legal document. Adding amendments is
the more common method. Several state constitutions have over
one hundred amendments (Tarr 2002). Change by an1endment is
a more piecemeal approach than a constitutional convention,
which usually takes a comprehensive approach. The amendment
process requires two steps-initiation and ratification. There are
three methods to initiate an amendment-legislative action, state
convention, or the initiative and referendum. Legislative action
requires a majority vote of both houses of the state legislature
before the people vote on it. States use conventions to propose
general election amendments to an existing document. Several
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states allow the addition of constitutional amendments by the
initiative. The initiative begins with a petition that requires acertain percentage of signatures as specified in the existing state
constitution. Once verified, the amendment goes directly to the
general election ballot. The most successful method, which
usually results in voter approval, is legislative initiation. However, research indicates that the larger the legislative majority required for initiation, the fewer amendments proposed (Lutz
1996). A majority vote is typically required in the general election (or in a legislative vote after the general election in states
that require it) for an amendment to talce effect (Bartley 1960;
Lutz 1996).
A constitutional convention is a more controversial approach. Often the proposal for convening a convention does not
win approval from the state legislature, or, if authoriz.ed by the
legislature, often does not win majority approval in a general
election referendum. Scholars characteriz.e constitutional conventions as more democratic and as an expression of "the direct
voice of the people in matters affecting general constitutional
overhaul" (Bartley 1960, 32). Conventions give opportunities for
citiz.ens to re-evaluate and re-assess political institutions. They
are "instruments, of normal constitutional evolution" (Bebout
and Sady 1960, 69).
Procedurally, a constitutional convention is an ad hoc, or
temporary, body. Depending on the state, it may result from a
popular initiative or from a popularly approved legislative proposal. The convention's authorization legislation describes its
jurisdiction. States form conventions to do one of two things, to
revise the document in its entirety or to add amendments to an
existing constitution. Occasionally, a convention may propose
enough amendments to make the proposed revisions comprehensive. The legislature typically sets the time and place for the
convention meeting, stipulates the selection of delegates, and
VOL .
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makes appropnatlons for expenses. Either legislators appoint
delegates or they may be elected from districts of equal popula tion (Dealey 1907). The work of the convention must be completed in a final recommendation (Goodman et al., 1973). If the
convention does draw up a new, comprehensive constitution, it
goes to the voters. Voters may accept the document as their new
fundamental law or reject the document thus keeping the old
constitution.
Historically , there have been approximately 240 conventions
called to revise constitutions (Bartley 1960). Nine states have
adapted a mandatory, periodic vote on a constitutional convention. Hawaii mandates an election every 9 years, the fewest
number of years between calls of any state. Alaska requires a
constitutional call every 10 years. Most often, the call for a new
constitutional convention fails. Sitting legislators are typically
reluctant to act if the authority to convene a constitutional convention is with the existing legislature .
Even in cases where the legislature has called a convention ,
many problems persist. State legislatures frequently linlit the
scope and power of the convention to prevent consideration of
controversial issues. Adequate representation in the selection of
delegates is another concern. As a result, only one state in the
past thirty years has used a constitutional convention and only
three states have revised their document over the past 35 years.
Most state constitutions have come to resemble a lengthy code of
laws compared to the national constih1tion with its relatively few
amendments. Compared to the difficulties of conventions , the
relative ease of amendment procedures has led to many state
constitutions having hundreds of amendments (Hargrave 1991).
An alternative to a convention or piecemeal amendment is
the constitutional commission . The commission approach has
grown in popularity because it is less costly than a constitutional
convention and becau se it linlits the extent of constitutional revi THE JOU RNAL OF POLITICAL
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sion. A commission is usually composed of a select group of
individuals, typically academic, business, and political leaders,
appointed by the legislature or the governor to make recommendations. Appointment may raise doubts about representativeness.
Another disadvantage may be the reluctance of an appointed
group actually to campaign for political approval of its proposals .
Because of legal and political barriers to state constitutional
change, most scholars today would suggest reliance on the
amendment process. In a comprehensively revised constitutional
proposal, many voters will find at least one part to oppose and
thus reject the entire proposal. An approach to revision using
major amendments allows more time for debate and reflection on
each one, while moving steadily toward an overall goal of comprehensive change. Since the electorate votes on controversial
parts separately, there is an increased chance of approval of at
least some of them (Goodman et al.1973), especially when compared to an up or down vote at once on a totally revised constitution. Alabama faces the pros and cons of the various approaches
to state constitutional change as it weighs alternatives for constitutional reform.
THE ALABAMA CASE .

Alabama's political history is typical of a Deep South state
in which one-party politics dominated and matters of race were
central well into the 20 th century. After the end of Reconstruction
in the 1870s, white populists who were mired in poverty and
threatened by political subordination challenged the traditionalistic, established, white Democratic Party elite and its alliance
with selected, loyal blacks. Racial tension became a popular way
to discredit the elite's tolerance of their former slaves as well as
a way to disfranchise black voters.
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To reassert traditional, one-party control, the Sayre Election
Law was passed in the 1892-1893 Alabama legislative session to
restrict the voting rights of illiterate or semi-illiterate white or
black voters. That way, elites could continue to control the populists' challenge by weeding out the less predictable whites and
simultaneously win the support of decent whites at the expense
of black representation. Any symbol of party or office that might
help an illiterate voter, black or white was removed from the ballot and candidates for office were listed in alphabetical order.
Voters had to cast their ballots within five minutes and could
only ask for help from polling officials appointed by the Democratic governor. The political effect of the Sayre Election Law
was magnified by electoral fraud. In counties where blacks were
a substantial percentage of the population, the white Democratic
Party won majorities over white populists or black Republicans
where no majority existed by "stuffing ballot boxes, voting in
and counting out at will" (Jackson 2002, 17).
Any hope for a political alliance between white populists and
black Republicans was snuffed in a movement for a constitutional convention to revise Alabama's constitution of 1875. Eliminating the black vote was a central reason for what became the
Constitutional Convention of 1901. When white Alabama Democrats learned that Mississippi and other southern states were
being allowed by the United States courts to disenfranchise ignorant and incompetent voters, the political question of the day became how to "relieve the state ' of the burden of the black man'
and get rid of many poor white voters in the process" (Jackson
2002, 19).
By 1896, the newly elected governor, Joseph F. Johnston,
called for a constitutional convention. The state legislature approved in 1898, but quickly repealed its decision through the
emergence of a temporary coalition of Democrats and populists .
Shortly thereafter, white conservatives, the old Democratic elite,
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abandoned its earlier position of working with blacks by launching a campaign to reassert its dominance by "bringing honesty
back into government" through restriction of black voters. The
campaign worked and on April 1, 1901, voters approved a constitutional convention 70,305 to 45,505. A large percentage of
the votes in favor of the convention derived from counties where
blacks outnumbered whites, a clear suggestion of fraud.
Convention delegates were chosen from House and Senate
districts and no poor whites or blacks attended. John B. Knox,
convention president, made clear in his opening address that establishing white supremacy was the focus of the convention, not
eliminating voter fraud or expanding black representation. The
vexing question was how to disenfranchise blacks without disenfranchising whites. The debate over how to accomplish this task
was held in secret and the Committee on Suffrage and Election
reporte d on June 30th • It recommended males over twenty-one be
allowed to vote if residency requirements were met, a poll tax of
$1.50 was paid, they could read or write English, and had been
involved in a lawful business for the past 12 months or owned 40
acres of land. Moreover, those who had been convicted of one of
the 30 crimes listed (crimes of which typically blacks had been
accused), they could not vote. Since many of these requirements
also disfranchised whites, a temporary measure was included to
allow individuals to register until January 1, 1903, if they met
other requirements, which included service in a war, being a descendant of a veteran, or a man of good character who understood
citizenshi~a clear exception for former Confederate soldiers.
These provisions-the grandfather clause, poll tax, and temporary plan-passed 104 to 14 at the convention.
Black Alabamians did not react favorably to the convention's decision. Several prominent blacks, including Booker T.
Washington, wrote letters to the convention. He argued that delegates at the constitutional convention should allow blacks to
VOL. 37 2008
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vote and have their votes counted since they paid taxes and performed other citizenship duties. Most of the letters argued th~t if
blacks were denied an education and the right to vote "there will
be [a] danger that he will become a beast, reveling in crime and a
body of death around the neck of the State" (Jackson 2002, 28).
The efforts of Washington did not convince convention delegates. The convention also ignored hopes for reform in the 1875
document, such as home rule for local governments and mandatory funding of infrastructure or education.
Alabama citizens ignored black protests against ratifying the
new constitution and arguments made by conservatives who
stated that the constitution would maintain white supremacy and
foster honest elections. The constitution was ratified 190,347 to
108,613. Only 30,000 votes came from black majority counties-a clear indication of voter intimidation or fraud.
After the ratification of the 1901 constitution, the number of
black voters decreased dramatically . By 1903, the State of Alabama only allowed 2,980 blacks to vote of the approximately
181,000 blacks eligible to vote in 1900. During the same period,
the number of eligible white voters also declined by approximately 41,300 (Flynt 2002). The result was a more controllable,
unified, one-party electorate.
Pressure to change the 1901 constitution has persisted since
its adoption. In 1915, Governor Emmet O'Neal unsuccessfully
advocated a new constitution due to a lack of funding for roads
and public education-essential
elements in state economic development. At the request of Governor B.M. Miller in 1931, The
Brookings Institution issued a report suggesting a new constitutional convention, but no action occurred. Beginning in 1957,
Governor Jim Folsom called special legislative sessions to enact
a constitutional convention on several occasions without result.
It was not until 1969 that Governor Albert P. Brewer has
some success in constitutional revision. He recommended a conTHE JOURNAL
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stitutional commission to propose revisions to the 1901 document. Both the governor and members of the legislature chose a
twenty-one member commission of white men to study the constitution. During the work of the commission, Governor Brewer
lost the election to George Wallace who was uninterested in constitutional reform. However, the commission continued to work
and released an interim report in 1971 and the final report in
1973. The report concluded, "The 1901 constitution, with its
[then] 327 amendments, is obsolete and should be replaced by a
constitution that is more adequate for the citizens of the state and
for their government, both state and local" (Stewart 2002, 55).
Although the legislature did not act on the commission's
entire report, the legislature did ultimately pass an amendment to
reform the court system. Chief Justice Howell Heflin made
reform of the state's court system a cornerstone of his judicial
electoral campaign and pursued passage of an amendment creating a unified court system in Alabama. These reform efforts
made Alabama's courts one of the most efficient systems in the
nation.
In 1979, Governor Forrest James named a committee that
recommended changes that ultimately passed the Senate but was
stalled and expired in the House. In 1982, lieutenant governor
Bill Baxley and state senator Ryan DeGraffenried attempted to
recompile the entire document and send it to the state legislature
as one comprehensive amendment. The new proposed constitution passed both houses in the legislature and voters had to decide whether to adopt the new constitution. However, the
Alabama Supreme court ruled that the legislature did not have
the authority to "put before the voters a new constitution in the
guise of a single amendment to the present document" (Stewart
2002, 57). Thus, the new document never received a vote of the
citizens of Alabama.
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Since the early 1990s, several attempts have been made to
call a constitutional convention. In 1993, the Senate passed a
resolution calling for a convention, but the leader of the House
killed the measure. More recently, in 2002, Governor Siegelman
suggested that the legislature give the voters a right to call a convention. However, the legislature did not endorse this measure
before the deadline to place the measure on the November ballot.
Similarly, a recent proposal to call a constitutional convention
stalled in the state legislative session ending June 7, 2007 (Tarr,
2007).
Although federal law eventually overrode discriminatory
provisions in the Alabama constitution of 1901, many of these
provisions remain in the document. For example, Alabamians
recently voted on referenda to repeal two particular sections of
the document that were racist. One banned interracial marriages;
the other mandated segregated schools. The first referendum
barely passed in a 1996 state referendum and the second referendum in the 2004 election failed.
The Campaign for Constitutional Reform in Alabama

Although the most recent attempt to call a constitutional
convention failed in the legislature, there are groups that continue to fight for constitutional change in Alabama. An extensive
grass roots organization has sought to increase public awareness
of the need of constitutional change. The most notable grass
roots organization is Alabama Citizen's for Constitutional
Reform (ACCR). ACCR is a public interest group formed in
2000 to assist in drafting a new constitution for Alabama. Some
of its notable members include a journalism professor from the
University of Alabama, Samford University's president, a former
governor, and a former U.S. representative (Flynt 2002) . ACCR
has campaigned and held public meetings throughout the state
since its inception to develop support for constitutional change
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In addition to the ACCR's grass-roots approach, the media
has increased public awareness about the issue. Newspapers
from around the state have r editorial series to increase public
awareness of constitutional reform. evertheless, several questions remain, among them, do Alabamians support of constitutional reform? Which method of constitutional reform would
Alabamians prefer? Finally, because of the history of the 1901
document, are there differences between the views of whites and
blacks on constitutional reform?
Alabamia ns' Views on Constitutional Reform

The ACCR conducted a telephone survey of a representative
sample of 600 registered voters in Alabama in March 2002. The
margin of error is +/-4%. Table 1 displays the results of the survey.
Aware ness. The data in Table 1 indicate that a large number
of survey participants (562 respondents of the 600 surveyed) are
aware of proposals to rewrite the constitution. While political
awareness is not a guarantee of success for reformers, it does
suggest a citizen body at least lmowledgeable of the subject matter. However, of those surveyed, a substantial proportion of
blacks remain unaware of constitutional reform efforts (41%
compared to 22% of whites). Lower awareness may lead to lower levels of black participation in a constitutional convention.
However, after the failure of the amendment to end segregated
schools in the 2004 election, more blacks may become aware of
needs to change the constitution.
Suppo rt. As shown in Table 1, approximately 70% of Alabamians are aware of proposals to rewrite the constitution, but
fewer than two-thirds of them support constitutional reform.
About three-fourths of blacks agree that the constitution needs
reform while slightly less than 60% of whites have the same
view. There is no noteworthy, underlying positive or negative
VOL. 37 2008
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association between race and interest or support for constitutional reform.
Reason to Support. Nearly two-thirds of reform supporters
declare the existing constitution needs rewriting because it is
outdated . About 20% of respondents feel that the existing constitution is too long or too complicated and that there is a need to
simplify it; 11% feel that tax policy and tax issues are reasons to
change the constitution, while another 2% focus on the need for
Table 1
Results of Survey Of Alabama Citizens Regarding
Constitutional Reform
Percent saying "Yes" (Nin parenthesis)

Comprehensive

..
"

,...
Awareness
Support
Reason to Favor
Reason to oppose
pecilies changes
Prefer legislature
Prefer convention
Elect delegates
Appoint delegates

69
60
90
80
51
12
68
84
67

(562)
(390)
(237)
(99)
(437)
(562)
(562)
(562)
(562)

~

.:,:

~
0

:c
~

=i

59 (71)
75
87
77
42
36
72
79
56

(53)
(46)
(10)
(43)
(31)
(87)
(96)
(68)

78
58
91
80
49
15
69
86
70

(322)
(186)
(167)
(69)
(164)
(36)
(304)
(379)
(309)

..e
..e

-=
b.O

.....
C

c.,

0.31
0.16
0.82
0.66
-0.02
-0.06
0.38
0.72
0.40

v.i
Weak
Weak

Strong positive
Moderate positive
No ne
Moderate negative

Weak
Strong positive
Weak

Note : Gamma is a measure of association that is based on concordant and discordant
pairs . If the number of concordant pairs exceeds the number of discordant pairs , there
is relative support for a positive relationship between two variables . In this case, the
association is between race and agreement about a feature of constitutional reform.
Gamma is standardized between plus or minus one to indicate the positive or negative
direction of the relationship as well as it relative strength. See Kenneth J. Meier ,
Jeffrey L Brudney , and John Bohte , Applied Statistics for Public and Nonprofit Administration , 6th ed. Belmont, California : Thompson-Wadsworth , 2006.

improvement in education funding. About 8% see a need to
promote home rule and reduce state control over local governments. Respondents also mention that a rewrite is necessary because the document is racist and embarrassing. Of the total
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sample, 4% mentioned racism as a reason to rewrite; only 2% of
whites listed racism as a reason compared to 11% of blacks.
Among respondents who support constitutional reform there is a
high, positive association (gamma = 0.82). The total number of
respondents is low however, 237 out of 600 interviewed or 40%.
This interracial coalition will be the core of support should a
reform effort be approved and modernization, not race, will be
its rhetorical key.
Reason to Oppose. Most Alabamians who oppose a constitutional rewrite believe it is unnecessary. A moderately positive
consensus appears to occur between blacks and whites that a rewrite is unnecessary (gamma = 0.60). However, the overall part
of the total interviewed (99 out of 600 or about 17%) is small.
This group will be the vocal, or maybe silent, opponent to consti-·
tutional change. More blacks than whites (22% to 16%) distrust
the need to rewrite the constitution or its supporters. When the
governor attempted to call a constitutional convention through
the state legislature earlier in 2001, the Congressional Black
Caucus opposed the convention. The rationale behind their decision was that the new document might be more detrimental to
the rights of blacks than the document from 1901. This could
also be the case as to why more blacks distrust supporters of a
constitutional rewrite. Another 11% of blacks and 13% of whites
feel there is no one capable of re-writing the constitution . Seven
percent of whites, but no blacks, fear constitutional refonn
would lead to a tax increase.
Knowing Where Change is Nee ded. Of the respondents who
believe constitutional reform is necessary, nearly a majority of
respondents, both white and black do not know where change is
needed in the constitution. This particular finding relates to previous research, which suggests that citizens that are more affluent are more comfortable and have a more positive view of
constitutional change (Goodman et al.1973). However, of those
VOL. 37 2008
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respondents that identified an area of change, a sizable portion of
both Blacks and Caucasians (19% overall) believe that the document should be updated and that more power is needed at the
local level (10% overall).
One of the major problems in the existing document is the
lack of home rule. While cities have relatively broad powers in
governing themselves, county governments have virtually no
authority without first going through the state legislature. As a
result, local matters not related to their constituency often bogs
down state legislators. Further, because the constitution requires
statewide votes on many local issues, a tax increase in a county
in north Alabama requires a vote by the entire state, which is an
inefficient process.
Prefer Legislature. As Table 1 shows, having a constitutional convention to reform Alabama ' s constitution seems to bode
well with most respondents (68% overall). However, when preference for a legislative approach is compared to preference for a
convention, almost 40% of the respondents oppose holding a
constitutional convention or prefer the legislature. There is a
moderately negative association on this concern (gamma= -0.60)
due to the larger percentage of blacks (36%) who support a legislatively driven amendment process compared to whites (15%).
Prefer Convention. Only about one-third of blacks prefer
that the legislature have the sole authority for re-writing the document. When respondents were asked directly if they would prefer a convention to re-write the constitution, there is general
agreement among both blacks and whites that a convention is the
best way to re-write the constitution. One of the major concerns
about holding a constitutional convention is the selection of delegates, whether or not they are appointed or elected (see below)
The selection of delegates at a constitutional convention could
determine the output from the convention and ultimately approval or rejection from the community (Cornwell et a/.1970).
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Elect Delegates. More Alabamians prefer the election of
delegates as opposed to delegate appointments to a constitutional
convention (84% to 67%). There is a strong positive association
among blacks and whites and the election of constitutional convention delegates (gamma = 0.72). However, even with elections, there are ongoing concerns about representation results.
For example, partisan at-large elections would more likely produce delegates who are party politicians, elected officials or bureaucrats, who may produce a document that preserves the status
quo. Non-partisan, at-large elections would probably generate
more refom1-oriented interest and an innovative document. Nonpartisan delegates may lack the organizational influence of party
structure and be more vulnerable to interest groups influence-a
potential limit on the innovative nature of a nonpartisan convention.
Appoint Delegates. A large percentage of respondents (67%)
prefer the option of a constitutional convention with no elected
officials acting as delegates, but there is no underlying agreement among blacks and whites (gamma = 0.40). Leaving out
elected officials may not lead to recommendations that are politically acceptable to current officeholders. If united, they could
become a major obstruction to adopting any changes. A mixture
of delegates, both elected officials and non-elected officials, may
be more practical.
Regardless of how its composition or how it proceeds, ultimately, whether voters would support a document produced
from a constitutional convention depends on whether there is a
process of compromise present in the convention. It will be vital
for all voting blocs in the convention to agree on a proposed
·document. Further, research also indicates that the "all-ornothing" approach to voters accepting the document could be
problematic for reformers. The idea of accepting a document in
its entirety has proved to be unworkable for states that have had
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constitutional conventions in the past because the likelihood of a
citizen rejecting one portion of the document and voting against
the entire document is relatively high (Cornwell et al.1970). This
may be the ultimate flaw of a state constitutional convention and
require reliance on a process controlled by the state legislature.
CONCLUSION

The case of Alabama suggests that constitutional revision
faces many problems that are typical of reform efforts in the
states. The difficulty of revising a state constitution is as difficult
as explaining complex issues to the public. Unfortunately, unlike
other political issues, reformers cannot explain why comprehensive constitutional revision is necessary in a television commercial sound bite. Although each state's situation is different,
Alabama's traditional political culture that depends on elite control shows why reform is difficult. Furthermore, Alabama's history of distrust, election fraud, racism, and demagoguery has
caused many to become wary of any reform. Yet, the survey data
reviewed above demonstrate that there are sizeable blocks of
public support that, if informed and encouraged, will continue to
press for constitutional modernization. Success in reforming Alabama's constitution will require compromises by citizens, interest groups, and elected officials who share concern about the
state's future and its people.
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